With the IED, you have a very specific tactical action with far reaching operational and strategic effects. While the tactical impact, although tragic, is small - one of a thousand cuts - the operational-strategic cost is higher, in terms of a perception of loss of control, in terms of a small, lo-tech (improvised) weapon stymieing one of the most technologically advanced fighting forces in the history of warfare.
As the article points out, we are making progress in the C-IED fight. But it's not over, and the adaptive nature of the enemy means this fight will go on for a long time. In future operations - counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance - we could see a quick return to the IED as the weapon of choice to check a larger, more capable armed force.
But I wonder, what other technologies could prove similarly disruptive in future wars? The most obvious would seem to be computers and networks. Think of how your day-to-day life is dependent on computers...imagine how much more so the modern military is. What sort of outside the box threats could we see in the next war?
4 comments:
Great set of articles. I think that this issue of applying technology to ones tacticial, operational, and strategic circumstances is critical. Future opponents that will succeed against our military will not do so by building a bigger, better tank, or a faster, stealthier aircraft. The will succeed by piggybacking communications systems on the internet and making them secure using steganography. They will use very high-performance anti-armor system, coupled with IEDs to blunt our armored forces, they will swarm our large naval forces with small boats and robotics. Most critically, they will film their attacks, create a thematic narrative, post these narratives to the internet, and exploit our media to directly attack our political will.
Hawkeye writes: "Most critically, they will film their attacks, create a thematic narrative, post these narratives to the internet, and exploit our media to directly attack our political will." I think this again returns to the heart of the strategic comms/information operations issue. We have to have a coherent strategy for dealing with this. Web-posted attack footage, for example, is largely the province of jihadist websites and video sharing sites. Mainstream media has not embraced the "gore" factor of such videos, but how long will that last?
Great work.
Very descriptive blog, I enjoyed that bit. Will there be a
part 2?
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